The current ceasefire discussions, which are based on parameters that have framed the talks since January, have several sticking points. Recent media reports point to several key issues in the ceasefire talks that could either derail them again or lead to an agreement.

At issue are several key demands of Hamas. Hamas wants Israel to leave the Netzarim Corridor, which separates Gaza City from central Gaza, and it wants Israel to leave the Philadelphi Corridor, which separates Gaza from Egypt.

The Hamas demands to be able to return armed men to northern Gaza by dismantling the IDF presence in Netzarim and be able to return to smuggling along the Egyptian border by ejecting Israel from the corridor represent the Hamas grand plan to return to power in Gaza.

It is part of the Hamas larger grand strategy of using October 7 to take over the West Bank. Hamas is already on the march in the West Bank, as evidenced by recent IDF airstrikes in the Tubas region and Jenin against Hamas key operatives. Hamas's demands in Gaza are step one in its next stage of operations.

These demands, which have been reported in numerous media reports in the region, may not only be Hamas demands. Other countries involved in the talks, such as Qatar and Egypt, may also have interests in Gaza and in Hamas returning to control these areas. Iran, which backs Hamas, has likely advised it that it needs to find a way to return to control the Netzarim corridor and the border with Egypt.

Hamas negotiation efforts boosted by its major regional supporters 

According to reports at The Washington Post, Doha was in contact with Tehran about Iran’s threats to attack Israel over the last two weeks. Why was Doha talking to Tehran? Supposedly in order to postpone the alleged Iranian attack so that the ceasefire talks could continue. Iran would have wanted something in return. It is likely that Iran’s hand as well as other hands in the region, such as Turkey which backs Hamas, are involved in advising Hamas about what points to hold firm in the ceasefire talks.

What do we know about the sticking points of a ceasefire deal? We know Hamas is focused on a reduced presence in the Philadelphi Corridor. We know Hamas may be flexible in regards to having the Palestinian Authority have a role on the Egyptian border. Why does Hamas not mind the PA being there? Because Hamas has a long-term goal of taking over the PA, so it sees these forces as simply its own forces in waiting.

Hamas has already been working with Beijing to create a unity deal for 14 Palestinian factions that will allow it to be in the PA. Hamas is quietly backed by the PFLP and Palestinian National Initiative and other groups. It also has more and more backing by armed groups in Tulkarm, Qalkilya, Jenin and Tubas and other areas of the northern West Bank.

The main Hamas goal is to get rid of the main areas that Israel still controls in Gaza; Netzarim and Philadelphi. Israel has chosen a tactic in Gaza of clearing areas of Hamas and then leaving. Israel uses the corridors in order to move forces quickly into areas of Gaza. Israeli forces never remain for more than a few weeks, while Israel controls the two corridors across Gaza to monitor northern and southern Gaza.

Hamas in charge of around eighty percent of Gaza

In general, Israel’s campaign in Gaza since October has left Hamas in control of the central camps area of Gaza; Maghazi, Nuseirat, Deir al-Balah and Bureij; and Israel has left Hamas in charge of around eighty percent of Gaza in total.

However, the IDF acts to keep the Hamas presence reduced in northern Gaza and southern Gaza through a tactic of raids. If there is a ceasefire deal, the raids will stop. Hamas will then regrow its power in northern and southern Gaza by using its current bases in Nuseirat and Bureij and Deir al-Balah to move forces around. Many of the forces Hamas has in Khan Younis, for instance, moved there after the IDF left in April and after the Rafah operation began in May.

Israel is wary that Hamas could moved armed men from Nuseirat across the Natzarim corridor into northern Gaza. Hamas has already stepped up operations against the IDF in this corridor. It has attempted sniper attacks and also attacks using explosive devices. The goal of the Hamas campaign is low level harassment of the IDF. Hamas and other groups do the same thing, targeting the IDF in areas near Rafah. We know this because Hamas openly brags about it to pro-Iranian media.

Hamas publishes daily details about its threats to IDF forces in Netzarim and in southern Gaza. Every day that Hamas crouches in the ruins of parts of Gaza, it potentially grows stronger, and every day that the IDF has to sit and wait, it potentially can become a target. If the IDF leaves these areas, though, Hamas will take control and rapidly return in force to northern and southern Gaza. Hamas has done this before after IDF ground operations.

The key sticking points in the ceasefire talks are evidence of the Hamas plan to return to Gaza. It wants to move armed men to northern Gaza and re-establish itself in southern Gaza. The corridors prevent this. If the IDF presence is reduced or the IDF leaves, then Hamas will return. It has already returned to much of Gaza and shown how it can regrow its networks quickly.